Threats / Ivanti / CVE-2019-11539
CVE-2019-11539
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-09-19
Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure and Policy vulnerability
Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure and Pulse Policy Secure allow authenticated administrators to inject and execute arbitrary commands via the admin web interface, enabling privilege abuse and system compromise.
Verdict
Today item, not a backlog item.
An authenticated admin can execute OS commands through the web interface due to insufficient input validation. This OS command injection vulnerability has been exploited in ransomware campaigns and poses critical risk to network infrastructure.
CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-035Ransomware use Flagged5EPSS 0.98544 (verify live)6Exploit Public PoC7CVSS 83CISA SSVC Exploitation: active · Automatable: no · Impact: total4
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreExploit available
Public proof-of-concept exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
10 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03), flagged for known ransomware use.
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.98544 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
CVSS 8 (CVSS:3.0/AC:H/AV:N/A:H/C:H/I:H/PR:H/S:C/UI:N) · Affected: Ivanti, Pulse Connect Secure and Pulse Policy Secure. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.CVSS — CNA-assigned (CVE.org), version 3.0, set at disclosure.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record (may be stale); the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
CISA SSVC (triage disposition)
Exploitation: active · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalCISA's own stakeholder-specific triage inputs, published in the CVE record (CISA Coordinator role). NOTE: this is CISA's three decision points; the final Act/Attend/Track decision also requires a Mission & Well-being input not published here, so no overall decision is asserted.
Currency of the record
CISA added this to its KEV catalog 922 days after the CVE record was published.KEV lag = CISA-KEV dateAdded − CVE.org datePublished; a floor on how long the known-exploited flaw sat in the public record before the federal catalog listed it. Severity/weakness here is CNA- or CISA-assigned (current at disclosure), independent of NVD's analysis backlog.
Public exploit available
Public exploit tooling is catalogued for this CVE (a functional/weaponized public exploit). Catalog entries: Metasploit module. We link the catalog page(s) only — no payload or code is hosted or restated here.Link, never host — the catalog page is the source; basicsecurity.net does not redistribute payloads.
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I authenticate to the admin web interface using valid credentials or a compromised admin account.
Business
Administrative access is compromised, enabling lateral movement and persistence within the security appliance.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I inject shell metacharacters into an admin-accessible input field to break out of the intended command context.
Business
Input validation failures allow arbitrary command execution at the appliance OS level.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I execute system commands to establish reverse shells, install backdoors, or exfiltrate configuration data.
Business
The security appliance becomes a beachhead for network-wide compromise and data theft.
4
Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4
Attacker
I use the compromised appliance to deploy ransomware payloads across connected networks and systems.
Business
Ransomware spreads from a trusted network chokepoint, encrypting critical assets and disrupting operations.
5
Lights out — disruption & extortion narrative 5
Attacker
I maintain persistence by modifying appliance configurations or installing rootkits.
Business
Long-term compromise of the security perimeter prevents detection and recovery.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05
Coverage & confidence
— what we know, and what we don’tEstablished (cited)
Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden
Disclosure & credit2
Catalogued by mitreCNA
Credited with finding itNo finder is named in the public CVE record or the scanned vendor advisory — attribution scoped to the sources checked.
Found an error? Propose a correction.
A correction is a cited counter-claim — it must cite a source,
gets reviewed by a second human, and is never auto-applied. See the
correction convention and our identity
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