Threats / Reolink / CVE-2019-11001

CVE-2019-11001 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-09-19

Reolink Multiple IP Cameras vulnerability

Authenticated OS command injection in Reolink IP cameras via TestEmail functionality allows admin-level attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An authenticated administrator can inject OS commands through the TestEmail feature in affected Reolink camera models, achieving remote code execution with root privileges. This vulnerability has been exploited in the wild.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-12-18⁴EPSS 0.37542 (verify live)⁵CVSS 7.2 (CISA)³CISA SSVC Exploitation: active · Automatable: no · Impact: total³

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score

Reported exploitation

1 independent public report of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.

cisa.gov ↗Confirmed

Exploited in the wild

Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-12-18).

CISA KEV ↗Confirmed

Probability (EPSS)

EPSS 0.37542 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.

FIRST EPSS ↗High

Severity / affected

CVSS 7.2 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) · Affected: Reolink, Multiple IP Cameras. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.CVSS — CISA-assigned via the ADP container (CVE.org), version 3.1; the CNA left no metrics, so CISA's own score is used ahead of NVD.

CISA-ADP ↗Reported

Weakness (CWE)

Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record (may be stale); the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.

NVD ↗Reported

CISA SSVC (triage disposition)

Exploitation: active · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalCISA's own stakeholder-specific triage inputs, published in the CVE record (CISA Coordinator role). NOTE: this is CISA's three decision points; the final Act/Attend/Track decision also requires a Mission & Well-being input not published here, so no overall decision is asserted.

CISA-ADP ↗Reported

Currency of the record

CISA added this to its KEV catalog 2081 days after the CVE record was published.KEV lag = CISA-KEV dateAdded − CVE.org datePublished; a floor on how long the known-exploited flaw sat in the public record before the federal catalog listed it. Severity/weakness here is CNA- or CISA-assigned (current at disclosure), independent of NVD's analysis backlog.

CISA KEV ↗CVE.org ↗Reported

WeaknessCWE-78 · OS Command InjectionInjection

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency

Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker

I authenticate to the camera management interface using valid admin credentials.

Business

Administrative access to camera systems is typically restricted to trusted personnel; compromise of admin accounts represents a significant trust boundary violation.

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker

I craft a malicious payload in the TestEmail functionality that injects shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary OS commands.

Business

The camera becomes a compromised node within the network infrastructure, potentially used as a pivot point for lateral movement.

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker

I execute commands with root privileges, gaining complete control over the camera device and its underlying operating system.

Business

Full device compromise enables attackers to modify firmware, exfiltrate video feeds, disable monitoring, or establish persistent backdoors.

What to do

— defensible action

Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.¹

Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

KEV listing (CISA)

EPSS probability (FIRST)

1 reported-exploitation source(s)

CVSS 7.2 — CISA-assigned (CVE.org ADP)

CISA SSVC triage disposition (CVE.org ADP)

CWE weakness mapping (NVD feed — CNA left none)

Catalogued by mitre (CNA)

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.

EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.

Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.

No finder is named in the public CVE record — attribution scoped to the sources checked.

Disclosure & credit²

Catalogued by mitreCNA

Credited with finding itNo finder is named in the public CVE record or the scanned vendor advisory — attribution scoped to the sources checked.

Found an error? Propose a correction.

A correction is a cited counter-claim — it must cite a source, gets reviewed by a second human, and is never auto-applied. See the correction convention and our identity npub1j7gt9ky7sfcrjn8jjee6693dkzvk4rahs0fk2suu7968dfns62zs3mqm3y.

With JavaScript off: publish a signed kind 1111 Nostr event tagging ["r", "https://basicsecurity.net/threat/cve-2019-11001.html"], ["v", "sha256:7f7ec702d66b55fc2cbd2318e91e544e2056a30f16d5c7d8403aa2dc2418539c"] (the record version), plus ["src", "<your source URL>"] and ["t", "correction"], per the correction convention. Our identity: npub1j7gt9ky7sfcrjn8jjee6693dkzvk4rahs0fk2suu7968dfns62zs3mqm3y. Cite-or-die: an event with no src is a coverage finding, not a proposal.